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ABSTRACT: Tracking/remote monitoring systems using GNSS are a proven method to enhance 
the safety and security of personnel and vehicles carrying precious or hazardous cargo. While 
GNSS tracking appears to mitigate some of these threats, if not adequately secured, it can be a 
double-edged sword allowing adversaries to obtain sensitive shipment and vehicle position data 
to better coordinate their attacks, and to provide a false sense of security to monitoring centers. 
Tracking systems must be designed with the ability to perform route-compliance and thwart 
attacks ranging from low-level attacks such as the cutting of antenna cables to medium and high-
level attacks involving radio jamming and signal / data-level simulation, especially where the 
goods transported have a potentially high value to terrorists. This paper discusses the use of 
GNSS in critical tracking applications, addressing the mitigation of GNSS security issues, 
augmentation systems and communication systems in order to provide highly robust and 
survivable tracking systems. 
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Introduction 
From the safety of workers to the protection of assets and the transportation of hazardous 
materials, GPS tracking has increasingly become an important part in providing a safeguard in 
the presence of adversaries. Vehicle tracking/remote monitoring systems using GPS are a proven 
method to enhance safety and security. While GPS tracking appears to mitigate some of these 
threats, if not adequately secured, it can be a double-edged sword allowing adversaries to obtain 
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sensitive shipment and vehicle position data to better coordinate their attacks, and to provide a 
false sense of security to monitoring centers. 
In this paper we discuss issues we have found pertinent to tracking for critical applications, how 
we have addressed these issues and how future technologies can further assist in providing 
enhanced security. 
Requirements for Tracking in Critical Applications 
The monitoring of assets and vehicles is typically performed by a center equipped to dispatch 
support personnel and manage crisis situations. Tracking systems can provide near-real-time 
communications to vehicles, and can be used to monitor vehicle data such as location and vehicle 
payload information. When emergency or critical messages are received by the monitoring 
center, an appropriate course of action can be decided, including the notification of necessary 
emergency responders. 
However, there are a number of issues with tracking systems that can pose serious threats to life 
or financial security if not adequately addressed. Such systems have several points of failure that 
can be exploited by adversaries, including but not limited to: 
 
 Wireless communication systems, which are potentially vulnerable to signal blockage and 
jamming;  
 Radio-navigation systems (e.g. GPS, DGPS, WAAS), which can fall victim to signal 
blockage, jamming and signal simulation; 
 Onboard vehicle / asset tracking units, which are potentially vulnerable to tampering and 
unauthorized modification;  
 Messaging and data protocols used for communication of monitoring data, which are 
potentially susceptible to unauthorized modification; and 
 Monitoring center information systems, which are potentially vulnerable to wide range of 
attacks from viruses and Trojans to distributed denial of service.  
 
Tracking systems must be designed with the ability to thwart a variety of attacks ranging from 
low-level attacks such as the cutting of antenna cables to medium- and high-level attacks 
involving radio jamming and signal or data-level simulation, especially where the goods 
transported have a potentially high value to terrorists. A set of high-level requirements for 
tracking in critical applications is summarized as follows: 
 
 Timely warning of hazardous or emergency situations. Such situations include (but are not 
limited to) route violation, movement out of a geo-fenced areas, activation of an emergency 
alarm, and engine failure; 
 Tamper-detection and tamper-evidence of the vehicle onboard unit (OBU), such that attempts 
to tamper with the device are detected and made known to the remote monitoring center, and 
are physically evident on the OBU. This includes unauthorized access to OBU data and 
firmware; 
 Fault-tolerance and survivability of communications, such that the tracking system is able to 
function in a timely manner in the presence of attacks, failures or accidents;  
 Authentication and association of the party being tracking, the driver and his truck for 
example; 
 Privacy and integrity of communications, such that an unauthorized party cannot obtain 
information from communications, and modification of messages by an unauthorized party 
can be detected; and 
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 Fault-tolerance and survivability of positioning systems such as GPS against signal blockage 
and intentional disruption. 
 
OBU integrity, communications and positioning functions are two particularly critical areas in 
which risk mitigation strategies must be put in place. The following two sections discuss these 
functions in more detail. 
 
Onboard Unit Integrity 
Guaranteeing the integrity of an onboard unit (OBU) is one of the more difficult challenges in 
building secure tracking systems. Above all, OBUs must fulfill two requirements: Availability 
and survivability in case of fault, and resilience to tampering.  
Availability and survivability is about ensuring the system remains operational in all situations. 
This is particularly import for tracking of hazardous materials. If communications is temporarily 
impeded, the OBU has sufficient information internally about the route (speeds, dangerous curves 
in roads, etc), cargo contents and potential dangers along the route to allow the driver to continue 
movement of the cargo safely. In order to increase the system’s ability to survive failures, route, 
environment and hazard information can be remotely loaded on the OBU before a mission 
commences, with the option of giving the driver visual indication of contextual route 
information. If communications are interrupted, the OBU becomes an autonomous system able to 
take basic actions based on situational awareness. Tamper-resistant memory within the OBU can 
be used to log any non-compliant activity during the course of a given trip. 
Resilience of an OBU to tampering is about ensuring that attempts to defeat or work around the 
safety and monitoring systems are thwarted. In this case the intent of an adversary is to prevent 
the OBU from recording position or to inhibit completely positioning and communications 
functions completely. There are clearly two different types of adversaries: one who is interested 
to violate route, speed or spatial restrictions to save time, fuel, etc., and one who is interested to 
hijack the vehicle. The following physical defenses are in protection of the former type of 
adversary.  
Removal or disruption of power supply 
The OBU must have an internal auxiliary power supply that can ideally support all functions 
including communications and positioning for several days, even weeks. At the very least the 
logging functions of the OBU must be supported. Removal of the power or any disruption of the 
power supply should be logged in the non-compliance log of the OBU. 
Removal of OBU from vehicle 
Removal of the OBU is difficult to prevent, however, tamper-evidence seals can provide a 
deterrent to the first type of adversary. Sensors in the OBU that can detect removal could also be 
used, with such activity being logged to the non-compliance log. 
Removal of GPS and wireless communication system antennas 
Removal of antennas can be detected by the OBU and should be logged to the non-compliance 
log. 
Tampering with OBU hardware 
Tampering with OBU hardware may be done to disable or defeat route-compliance functionality, 
or to modify hardware in order to spoof the OBU position, state, etc. Both tamper-detection 
sensors and tamper-evidence seals can be used as a deterrent. Cryptographic keys should be 
stored in tamper-resistant memory and ideally in a tamper-resistant module containing both the 
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cryptographic accelerator and memory for key storage. Tampering attempts should be logged to 
the non-compliance log. 
Tampering with OBU software 
Similar to hardware, software modification may be done to defeat route-compliance functionality, 
or to modify hardware in order to spoof the OBU position, state, etc. Using a methods of 
authentication of the software and firmware updates can prevent unauthorized modification of 
software. The OBU compliance-logs should be stored on non-volatile memory in a tamper-
resistant way using cryptography to ensure unauthorized modification of the logs is detected.  
 
There is little that can be done if the second type of adversary succeeds to impede 
communications by cutting antennas for example. The best defenses in this case include hiding of 
the antennas, mounting of fake antennas and the use of protocol extensions which allow the 
operations center to know when communications has been disrupted in a timely manner. 
 
Communication Technologies 
There are numerous factors that affect the robustness and survivability of communications from 
the OBU to the operations center for use in critical applications. The following subsections 
discuss these factors with respect to available technological solutions.  
 
Environment  
Environment plays an important part in deciding the type of communication systems to use. In 
unstable or developing states, terrestrial communications infrastructure such as GSM can suffer 
from poor coverage and frequent outages. In addition, data communicated over public terrestrial 
networks such as GSM or VHF radio are more susceptible to interception, whether by rouge 
employees in public network operators, or adversaries who monitor VHF transmissions directly. 
Information including position is critical, as interception of this data can result in potential 
breaches of security and endangerment of life. 
As such, maintaining independence from local infrastructure is necessary to ensure that 
communications are survivable. Even in developed countries, it may not be acceptable to trust 
public networks in highly-critical situations. Networks can become saturated or are shut-down in 
emergency situations. Use of cheaper local radio networks has to be balanced with cost of more 
expensive satellite communications and equipment.  
 
Privacy and Integrity 
A typical requirement of tracking systems is for the end-to-end encryption of data from the 
vehicle (OBU) or asset to the middleware at the monitoring center. The use of encryption 
protocols can provide security services such as authentication, data integrity, non-repudiation and 
privacy.  
Strong authentication is critical in assuring that a given set of messages originated from an 
authorized source (the OBU). This effectively prevents adversaries from producing messages 
without compromising the OBU. In the event an incident arises, it is particularly important that 
information (tracking data) about the incident remains confidential. Information leaks made by a 
third-party such as a telecommunications provider can cause safety issues, financial loss, and 
damage to the victimized company’s reputation. 
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As such, there is a requirement for flexible and bandwidth efficient security protocols that can 
traverse different types of networks with different communication paradigms. 
  
Redundancy 
For certain types of critical applications, reliance on a single communication technology is 
insufficient. In addition to GSM and other terrestrial radio networks, there are a number of 
satellite-based communication solutions that can be used in a multi-modal solution.  
Multi-modal solutions typically use a combination of either GSM and satellite communications 
(SATCOM) or VHF and SATCOM. Combined with sophisticated algorithms, the multi-modal 
devices provide communication redundancy and cost optimization, resulting in lower operating 
costs than a SATCOM-only solution, and higher reliability than a VHF- or GSM-only solution. 
Through the use of specialized protocols, even intentional disruption of communications (such as 
disconnection of OBU antennas) can be detected by the operations center in near-real-time. 
 
Satellite Communications Providers 
Each candidate SATCOM provider reviewed in this section has characteristics that make it well 
suited to particular applications and geographical regions. Although both Geostationary (GEO) 
and Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) commercial satellite communication providers are available, only 
LEO satellite systems will be discussed. LEO satellite systems (up to 1,500km in altitude) offer 
the following advantages over GEO systems (orbit of an altitude of 35,800km) for tracking 
applications: 
 
 LEO systems provide better quality of service to low-powered mobile user equipment; 
 LEO systems can make use of low-cost portable, omni-directional antennas instead of bulky 
expensive directional antennas used with GEO systems; and 
 LEO systems offer better survivability due to constellation rotation if a satellite fails. GEO 
satellite failure could result in regional system outage. 
 
Tables 1-3 summarize operational characteristics of the various SATCOM systems that have 
been considered.  
 
Orbcomm 
Orbcomm is packet-switched two-way satellite communication system with a space segment 
consisting of a constellation of 63 LEO satellites and a ground segment consisting of a number of 
Gateway Earth Stations (GES) and Gateway Control Centers (GCC) located throughout the 
world. The Orbcomm system operates in the VHF part of the spectrum between 137-150Mhz. All 
communications within the Orbcomm system must pass through a gateway (a GES and GCC).  
Orbcomm provides four data service elements (ORBCOMM Global, 1999): Data Reports of 6 
bytes (subscriber originated), Commands of 5 bytes (subscriber terminated), Messages of about 
100 bytes and GlobalGrams, which are packets that are sent or received when the visible satellite 
does not have access to an Orbcomm gateway.  
A GlobalGram packet is stored in satellite memory until the satellite can establish contact with a 
gateway. In the case of a subscriber-terminated packet, the packet is received from the gateway 
and stored in memory until contact with the subscriber is possible, and the subscriber requests it. 
Inherit in this type of store-and-forward functionality is the high latency of communications, 
which is unacceptable for some critical applications. 
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When data are sent as a Message, the subscriber and gateway must both be in line-of-sight of a 
satellite, resulting in lower latency communications. The suitability of this system for critical 
applications depends on the region and availability of a gateway. Figure 1 illustrates the global 
coverage of the Orbcomm satellite constellation. 
 
Table 1. Orbcomm Characteristics 
Type Data only. 
Coverage Approx 84.6 percent actual coverage using 
Globalgram mode (store and forward); significantly 
less coverage using gateway mode, as a given satellite 
must have line of sight to both user equipment and a 
gateway. 
Bandwidth 2.4 Kbps uplink; 4.8 Kbps downlink 
Pros Low cost hardware. 
Low cost data service. 
Cons Occasional coverage holes, which can be severe 
depending on geographical region and messaging 
mode.   
High latency in GlobalGram mode. 
 
 
Figure 1: Orbcomm Satellite Constellation Global Coverage  
(Source: Frame from a SaVi simulation (Worfolk and Thurman, 2006)) 
 
Globalstar 
Globalstar is a LEO satellite network providing both voice and data services. The system consists 
of a space segment of 48 satellites, a ground segment comprising multiple gateways and ground 
operations control centers. Path diversity, in which calls are routed through as many as four 
satellites, is responsible for the high level of reliability, reducing the likelihood of a call being 
dropped. Globalstar supports voice and a number of data services including short message 
(SMS), asynchronous data and packet data services. Figure 2 illustrates the global coverage of the 
Globalstar satellite constellation. Although the coverage illustrated appears to be quasi-complete, 
it is in fact limited to where user-equipment has line-of-sight of both a satellite and a gateway
1
.   
                                                 
1
 Refer to http://www.globalstareurope.com for a map of the effective coverage of Globalstar. 
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Table 2. Globalstar Characteristics 
Type Voice / Data. 
Coverage Approx 96.4 percent actual satellite coverage; 
however, effective coverage is much lower as a 
given satellite must have line-of-sight to both user 
equipment and a gateway. 
No coverage at poles. 
Bandwidth Full-duplex 9.6 Kbps. 
Pros High reliability. 
Relatively high data rate. 
Cons Lower effective coverage. 
 
 
Figure 2. Globalstar satellite constellation global coverage  
(Source: Frame from a SaVi simulation (Worfolk and Thurman, 2006)) 
 
Iridium 
Iridium is a LEO satellite network with a constellation of 66 satellites, three terrestrial gateways 
and a satellite network operations center. It is the only service with 100 percent complete 
coverage including oceans, airways and Polar regions (See Figure 3). Unlike Globalstar and 
Orbcomm, which are both based on bent-pipe technology, Iridium employs an intra-satellite link 
architecture such that the satellites are able to communicate both with gateways and between 
themselves, alleviating the need for regional gateways. The intra-satellite link architecture 
additionally supports end-to-end communications between two users after initial call set-up, 
without passing though ground stations. This facilitates global coverage with low signal latency. 
Iridium supports voice and numerous types of data services. Among the data services, there are 
short message (SMS), dial-up data, direct Internet, router-based unrestricted digital interworking 
connectivity solution (RUCIDS) and short burst data (SBD) services. The Iridium network 
additionally supports the same security algorithms for authentication and encryption that GSM 
does. (Iridium Satellite LLC, 2003) 
 
Table 3. Iridium Characteristics 
Type Voice / Data. 
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Coverage 100 percent. 
Bandwidth Full-duplex 2.4 Kbps (up to 8 Kbs with data 
compression). 
Pros 100 percent coverage. 
Low signal latency. 
Lower-cost hardware due to low power requirement. 
Cons Relatively low bandwidth. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Iridium satellite constellation global coverage  
(Source: Frame from a SaVi simulation (Worfolk and Thurman, 2006)) 
 
Integration of Communication Technologies  
A flexible architecture has been developed to support the requirements of companies seeking a 
robust tracking solution. The tracking system is developed around a middleware platform, which 
provides secure end-to-end communications with onboard units (OBUs) and exposes access to 
OBU functions and its geographical database through web services.  
Multi-modal communications is achieved by algorithms that are located both on the OBU and the 
middleware, ensuring data received is consistent. Algorithms that detect the performance of a 
given data channel are used in order to route data based on channel performance and message 
priority. While the middleware can support any number of different communication protocols and 
paradigms, the OBUs were developed with two modes of operation: SMS and packet mode.  
SMS Mode 
SMS mode can operate with both GSM and Iridium, as illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5. GSM 
is used in preference to Iridium to reduce communication costs. Where General Packet-Radio 
Service (GPRS) is not supported, SMS mode is used with GSM. An SMSC gateway facilitates 
access to the messages from the middleware. Where there is no GSM coverage, or the SMS 
Internet gateway is offline, point-to-point Iridium SMS messages provide complete independence 
from terrestrial infrastructure. High-priority and emergency messages can be configured to use 
Iridium messaging by default.  
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Figure 4: Tracking with Iridium 
 
 
Figure 5. Tracking with GSM 
 
Packet Mode 
Packet mode provides lower-cost messaging via GSM GPRS or Iridium SBD service. Messages 
from both services are accessed via the Internet, and represent the mode of communications used 
for the majority of communications.  
 
In addition to data services, Iridium and GSM both offer push-to-talk voice capability for 
communication with a person or driver in an emergency situation. Both technologies support the 
use of voice and data services simultaneously. 
  
Secure GNSS Technologies 
There are two types of disruption that can affect the integrity of a Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) system: unintentional and intentional. The former is caused by signal 
interference in space or on the ground, transmission errors and hardware failures.  
Unintentional disruptions (excluding unintentional jamming) of GNSS can be mitigated by a 
myriad of systems, including space-based augmentation systems (WAAS, EGNOS); ground-
based augmentation systems (DGPS, marine radio beacons); and a number of privately operated 
services providing improved accuracy and integrity. GPS augmentation systems can be used to 
provide integrity and availability to civilian GPS. WAAS and EGNOS both provide ranging 
signals that can be used by a GPS receiver as if there were a part of the GPS constellation. 
WAAS notifies all users within 6 seconds of a problem with any satellite in the GPS 
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constellation, including the WAAS signal itself. This type of integrity indicates malfunctions and 
physical disturbances. It provides information on the health of the satellite constellation and 
augmentation system, but does not provide cryptographic integrity or authentication of the data 
source.  
Intentional disruption, however, cannot be effectively mitigated by existing augmentation 
systems. Intentional disruption can represent a real threat against safety-critical applications such 
as hazardous-materials tracking. This imminent threat in the civilian domain by terrorists, hackers 
and adversaries engaging in telecommunication warfare has generated the demand for GNSS 
technologies able to prevent or provide mitigation strategies against intentional disruption. Refer 
to (John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2001) for detailed information on 
GPS vulnerabilities in the transportation infrastructure. Intentional disturbances range from GPS 
jamming to spoofing of the GPS signal and GPS augmentation data.  
GPS Course Acquisition (C/A) code transmitted on the L1 frequency is very weak (typically -
130dBm at the antenna) and as such, relatively easy to jam. GPS jammers generate noise on the 
L1 band and corrupt the original signal, causing errors in acquisition and tracking. It is well 
known that a 1-watt (cellular phone-size) jammer can be built from readily available schematics, 
and can prevent a good quality civilian receiver from acquiring the C/A code from distances as 
far as 60 km. This is a significant threat for critical tracking applications; however anti-jamming 
antennas are typically too expensive for tracking applications. If sufficiently critical, anti-jam 
antennas should be considered. 
GPS spoofing is significantly more difficult than jamming and has the intent cause a GPS 
receiver to lock on to signal(s) that appear legitimate in order to mislead the targeted user. (John 
A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2001) notes that at present there are no 
practical mitigation methods available for spoofing attacks, and that a few potentially effective 
techniques would be too expensive for civilian applications, in particular intelligent 
transportation systems. It is additionally noted that until civilian solutions are available, training 
of users and operators of intelligent transportation systems about GPS disruption, detection and 
alternative providers is crucial to minimizing the impact of GPS degradation or disruption.  
A number of simple navigation checks such as the following, can be performed using 
commercial-off-the-shelf receivers and could provide effective mitigation to short-term 
disruption: 
 Continuity checking of time and position;  
 Use of a trusted clock to detect time drift associated with spoofing;  
 Use of navigation sensors such as inertial measurement units (IMUs) to detect anomalies; and 
Validation of the navigation solution, checking for large residual errors. 
 
The use of inertial measurement units (IMUs) integrated with GPS is recommended, not only for 
detecting anomalies, but as a redundancy measure in case the GPS signal becomes temporarily 
unavailable for short time periods. 
 
Next-Generation GNSS 
The modernization of GPS and the development of the new Galileo satellite navigation system 
will provide a number of new civil services over multiple frequencies with improved accuracy, 
integrity and security. These new services will act as an enabler for systems that provide certified 
levels of security and integrity.  
The risk of Jamming can be decreased through the use of these services, as the likelihood of 
signals on different frequencies of both GPS and Galileo being simultaneously jammed is 
reduced, however, not impossible. In addition the use of multiple GNSS provides improved 
mitigation against control-segment problems.  
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The next-generation GPS will provide new civilian services on the L2 and L5 frequency bands. 
Galileo will provide four navigation services on the L1, E5 and E6 bands, three of which are for 
civilian use. The Open Service (OS) will be accessible to all users without a usage fee. The 
Safety of Life service will provide the same position and timing accuracy as the OS with the 
broadcast of integrity information and guaranteed service levels. The Commercial Service (CS) 
will provide higher performance than that of the OS and a limited data broadcasting capability for 
market applications for a fee. Access to CS data will be controlled through the use of Navigation 
Data Encryption (NDE). Encrypted CS data will be present in the E1-B, E5b and E6-B signal 
data channels. Access to the E6 signal (with the exception of the E6-A) channel will be controlled 
through the use of Spreading Code Encryption (SCE). The Public Regulated Service (PRS) will 
provide position and timing to governmental applications. Access to the PRS will be restricted 
through the use of SCE. 
Table 4 lists the security services projected to be included on each signal in Galileo. To date there 
is no indication that any security services will be provided to civilian users. (Refer to the OS 
Interface Control Document (European Space Agency, 2006) for details of the Galileo signals 
and services) 
 
Table 4. Galileo Signals  
Signal Channel Type SCE NMA NDE Service 
E2-L1-E1 E2-L1-E1B Data No No CS data OS / SoL / CS 
E2-L1-E1 E2-L1-E1C Pilot No -- -- OS / SoL / CS 
E5a E5aI Data No No No OS / SoL 
E5a E5aQ Pilot No -- -- OS / SoL 
E5b E5bI Data No No CS data OS / SoL / CS 
E5b E5bQ Pilot No -- -- OS / SoL / CS 
E6 E6B Data Yes No Yes CS 
E6 E6C Pilot Yes -- -- CS 
 
While the Galileo high-level mission definition (European Space Agency, 2002) and design 
consolidation (Galilei Consortium, 2003) indicated that NMA may be incorporated into the OS, 
the first public draft version of the OS Interface Control Document (ICD) (European Space 
Agency, 2006) does not include provision for such a service. 
While the details of the CS are yet to be publicly released, the CS could be potentially useful for 
tracking in critical applications. The CS could be used to mitigate the risk of spoofing and 
provide high quality of service and integrity guarantees. A CS receiver, being a multi-frequency 
receiver, would also have a level of immunity to non-intentional jamming. 
 
GNSS Security Services 
GNSS security services can be used for a wide range of purposes, including cryptographic signal 
validation, which provides strong integrity and quality of service guarantees to applications. 
Security services for GNSS can be categorized into the following three classes (Wullems et al., 
2005): 
Navigation Data Authentication and Cryptographic Integrity Protection Mechanisms 
Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) is a mechanism designed to overcome spoofing and 
to provide increased safety and service guarantees. An NMA scheme would add authentication 
messages to the navigation message stream, both authenticating the source and providing 
cryptographic integrity protection of the navigation data.  
Should an adversary attempt to generate or change the navigation data, a receiver would be able 
to detect the activity. An adversary would not be able to simulate the authentication message, as 
he would not have the keys required to generate them. 
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Signal Access Control Mechanisms 
A signal access control mechanism facilitates restriction of access to the signal from unauthorized 
users. GPS and Galileo signals use Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Code-Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA). Access to the signal can be restricted through Spreading Code 
Encryption (SCE), in which the spreading code is protected using cryptography. Only users with 
the appropriate cryptographic keys are able to generate/obtain the secret spreading code which 
then allows de-spreading of the signal.  
SCE in combination with NMA, provides the best protection against spoofing. SCE alone can 
provide protection from spoofers so far as the keys or cryptographic algorithms used to 
decrypt/generate the spreading code are secure. A spoofer with access to the spreading code, 
either legitimately or illegitimately could potentially spoof other users of the signal. 
Navigation Data Access Control Mechanisms 
A navigation data access control mechanism facilitates restriction of access to parts or all of a 
navigation data stream modulated over a given signal through encryption. Navigation Data 
Encryption (NDE) can be used to support various value-added services. 
 
Conclusion 
Secure tracking serves to improve safety by enforcing route compliance and providing protection 
from theft. This paper has addresses a number of requirements for secure tracking systems from 
onboard unit integrity to wireless communication systems and global satellite navigation systems. 
Wireless communication systems and GPS represent the most significant points of failure in 
tracking systems. While there are numerous options for wireless communications systems (many 
networks, terrestrial and satellite-based) and a certain level of maturity for communications 
security, GPS does not offer the same guarantees or cost-effective backup solutions, and is 
perhaps destined to become more vulnerable to attacks that it’s communications counterparts. It 
is nearly certain that Galileo will have a big impact, on both performance and security in this 
arena.  
We predict that the future of GNSS security will most likely be analogous to trends seen in IT 
security. As IT technologies grew, the number of attacks and sophistication of these attacks 
increased at alarming rates. GPS analysts have been led to believe that an increase of attacked 
(such as spoofing) is improbable due to their inherent complexity. However, the rapid growth of 
GNSS applications in recent years and the future projected growth will likely increase the 
number of applications where security exploits could result in financial reward, risk to life, or 
cause financial damage. In addition, the cost of equipment that can be used to mount attacks has 
dropped significantly and will most likely continue to reduce. This combination of effects will 
inevitably result the increase of attacks against GNSS dependant applications in the future.  
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